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Indonesian Government’s COVID-19 Measures, January–May 2020: 
Late Response and Public Health Securitization
Tangguh Chairil
Abstract
The Indonesian government’s measures to control the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
pandemic can be characterized by late response due to initial de-securitization of the issue, and 
later securitization that limits its very efficacy in restricting the spread of the pandemic. This 
article uses securitization theory to analyze the government’s measures to control the COVID-19 
pandemic and discusses how the government’s increasing reliance on military figures and 
national security agencies influences the measures used to control the COVID-19 pandemic. This 
study finds that initially, the government seemed to be trying to de-securitize the issue, denying 
warnings that the virus might have existed undetected in Indonesia. Then, after the first cases 
were confirmed in March 2020, the government responded by securitizing the issue. The delay in 
the government’s response to COVID-19 caused the audience to not fully accept the government’s 
securitization efforts because public trust in the government’s measures was already low, while 
the means of emergency action taken by the government against the threat of COVID-19 are also 
limited. The government has also been overly reliant on influential military figures and national 
security agencies. The government also tended to downgrade the threats, lack transparency, and 
even use the pandemic to crack down on anti-government smears. This article concludes that the 
government needs to change their approach to COVID-19 measures and prioritize the human 
security dimension by not downgrading the threats and upholding transparency.
Keywords:
coronavirus; COVID-19; public health security; Indonesia; securitization
Introduction
As the coronavirus  disease  2019 
(COVID-19) pandemic spread to Indonesia, 
there are notes which can be taken from 
the Indonesian government’s handling of 
the pandemic. First, until February 2020, 
the Indonesian government seemed to be 
attempting to de-securitize the issue, denying 
warnings that the virus might have already 
existed undetected in Indonesia. The Minister 
of Health, Terawan Agus Putranto (hereinafter 
Terawan) infamously told the public not to 
panic over the virus and “just ‘enjoy’ it” (Warta 
Ekonomi, 2020, January 27). Other government 
officials also made public statements which 
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underestimated the COVID-19 issue, some 
of which this article presents in the results 
section. In this period, the government seemed 
more concerned of the economic impacts, 
as the President Joko Widodo (hereinafter 
Jokowi) announced that the government 
was considering providing incentives for the 
tourism and aviation industry (Presiden RI, 
2020, February 17).
Second, only since the first cases were 
confirmed in March 2020 has the Indonesian 
government responded by securitizing the 
issue. In terms of public health measures, the 
government announced the implementation of 
large-scale social restrictions (PSBB) and strict 
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physical distancing to restrict the spread of the 
pandemic. Meanwhile, in terms of economic 
mitigation, the government announced several 
social protections, tax stimulus, and other 
economic measures. Despite the restrictions, 
by April the pandemic had spread to all 34 
provinces.
Third, so far, the Indonesian government’s 
measures to the pandemic has apparently relied 
on influential military figures – both retired 
generals in the Cabinet and active officers 
in national security agencies. The Minister 
of Health, Terawan, was a military doctor. 
The government’s COVID-19 Mitigation 
Acceleration Task Force is led by the Chief of 
the National Disaster Management Agency 
(BNPB), Lt. Gen. Doni Monardo (hereinafter 
Doni), who is an active three-star general. 
Other military figures fill up the positions in the 
government’s COVID-19 measures. However, 
the reliance on military figures seemed not to 
correlate with the human security dimension 
of the pandemic, as the government could not 
restrict the spread of the pandemic and the 
number of cases and death keeps rising.
This article thus discusses the Indonesian 
government’s measures to the COVID-19 
pandemic in January to May 2020 using 
securitization (and de-securitization) theory 
in International Relations. The author chose 
to use this theory because it provides a 
useful tool to analyze the dynamics of the 
government’s COVID-19 measures: The 
initial lack of response to the pandemic is 
seen as the government’s de-securitizing 
attempts, while the emergency measures 
conducted after the first confirmed cases is 
viewed as securitization of the pandemic. 
Securitization theory also enables examining 
the government’s communication about the 
COVID-19 pandemic, which initially tended 
to underestimate the issue.
The author chose the period of January–
May 2020 to provide a timely comparison 
between before the official confirmation of the 
pandemic in Indonesia (January–February 
2020) and after the pandemic began in the 
country (since March 2020). The author chose 
to study only three months after the start of the 
pandemic (March–May 2020) because the onset 
of the pandemic response is considered the best 
period to note the drastic shift from the normal/
non-emergency politics to the government’s 
emergency measures.
The structure is as follows: This article 
first reviews literature on securitization (and 
militarization, as the concept which is often 
linked with securitization), then focusing on 
the securitization of public health issues. This 
article then reviews literature on the Indonesian 
government’s increasing reliance on military 
figures, before discussing how these military 
figures influence the government’s measures 
to the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, this 
article discusses the government’s COVID-19 
measures using securitization theory. The 
author expects that this article contributes to 
the understanding that the government needs 
to change its security-heavy approach to the 
pandemic, as it is a public health issue.
Literature Review
Securitization Theory
Securitization theory was developed by 
Copenhagen School scholars, such as Barry 
Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, who 
are mainly concerned on how security is 
socially constructed in international politics, 
and the extent to which political actors view 
and construct certain issues as security threats. 
Securitization theory examines the process 
in which actors declare certain issues as 
“existential threats” to a certain referent object. 
If accepted by the audience, the securitization 
process allows the state to suspend normal 
political methods and use emergency measures 
in response to the crisis. In this sense, security is a 
place of negotiation between securitizing actors 
and the audience (Wæver, 1995; McSweeney, 
1996; Buzan & Wæver, 1997; Buzan, Wæver, 
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& de Wilde, 1998; Huysmans, 1998; C. A. S. E. 
Collective, 2006). 
In the securitization process, threats are 
articulated in “speech act”. In this process, the 
securitizing actors use the language of security 
and threats to claim that the state needs to use 
whatever means necessary to block a threat. An 
issue is successfully securitized if the audience 
accepts it as an existential threat and agrees 
that the state needs to use emergency methods 
in responding to it. The audience will accept 
securitization if there is a series of “facilitating 
conditions”, including the grammar of security, 
social capital of the securitizing actors, condition 
related to threat (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 
1998; Wæver, 2000), and conditions related to 
audience (Vuori, 2008). These conditions allow 
the audience to accept securitization carried 
out by the securitizing actors, who are usually 
political leaders.
According to John R. Searle (1975), 
Daniel Vanderveken (2002), and Juha A. Vuori, 
(2008), there are five types of speech acts: 
assertive, directive, commissive, expressive, 
and declaration. Assertive speech acts take 
forms such as statements, explanations, and 
assertions. Directive speech acts take forms 
such as orders, requests, and commands. 
Commissive speech acts take forms such as 
vows, threats, and guarantees. Expressive 
speech acts take forms such as apologies, thanks, 
and congratulations. Finally, declarations take 
forms such as declaring war, pronouncing 
wedlock, and adjourning a meeting.
The opposite of securitization is de-
securitization, a process in which actors 
keep certain issues away from the security 
realm and re-enter it into the normal political 
sphere. Once an issue is de-securitized, it will 
not be dealt with by security logic and not be 
declared a threat but returned to the ordinary 
public sphere. De-securitization can be done 
by not discussing an issue as a threat at all, 
managing the issue so that it does not spiral, 
and moving the issue back to normal politics 
(Wæver, 1995; Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 
1998).
According to Lene Hansen (2012), there are 
four forms of de-securitization: change through 
stabilization, replacement, re-articulation, and 
silencing. The first form of de-securitization 
is indicated by explicit change in the security 
discourse. Replacement is when one issue is 
excluded, while another is securitized. Re-
articulation is indicated by the offering of a 
political solution to the threat and addressing 
the source of conflict. Finally, silencing is when 
an issue disappears or does not register in a 
security discourse.
Securitization and Militarization
A concept that is often linked with 
securitization is militarization, in terms of 
the emergency methods used by the state to 
respond to an existential threat. While the 
emergency methods are not entirely and 
focused only on military means, some of the 
ways the state uses to block a threat are indeed 
military mobilization. To avoid equalizing 
securitization with militarization, it is necessary 
to define militarization.
Scholars have defined militarization 
as “military build-up”. M. V. Naidu (1985), 
for example, defines militarization as “the 
gathering of arms, the raising of armies, the 
seeking of military bases and allies, etc.”. 
Andrew L. Ross (1987) differentiate two forms 
of militarization: the first one is “the process … 
that results in militarism” and the second one 
is “military build-up”. Similar to Ross’ second 
form of militarization, Alexander Wendt and 
Michael Barnett (1993) define militarization as 
“the accumulation of capacity for organized 
violence”. Julian Schofield (2007, p. 11) defines 
militarization as “the measure of the extent of 
use of military structures and procedures in 
a state’s decision-making process”. Peter B. 
Kraska (2007) defines militarization as “the 
implementation of the ideology [of] militarism”, 
“the process of arming, organizing, planning, 
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training for, threatening, and sometimes 
implementing violent conflict”.
Scholars have suggested that a high 
degree of militarization of a state’s government 
increases the likelihood of war and results in a 
less effective strategy. According to Schofield 
(2007, p. 11), it results in a less effective strategy 
due to favoring the military over other state 
instruments. Schofield further argues that the 
militarization of a state’s decision-making 
process occurs when the military, or those with 
a military perspective, gain relatively greater 
influence while the civilian policymaking 
institutions gain relatively less influence. Thus, 
the state’s leadership becomes increasingly 
sensitive to a military perspective on policy 
issues.
After defining militarization, we can 
see the relations between securitization and 
militarization. Setenay Yağanoğlu (2006, pp. 
24-30) has summed it up well: In militarist 
states where the government and society has 
been militarized, when an issue is securitized, 
it is easier for the people as audience to expect 
military means to be used to deal with the 
situation and to accept this choice, with little 
to no room to question its rationality. On the 
other hand, security becomes the justification 
label for military means to be used in the 
first place when dealing with security issues. 
Therefore, according to Yağanoğlu (2006, pp. 
24-30), the relations between securitization and 
militarization is like “chicken and egg”. This is 
because securitization is fed from militarization 
and enables the continuation of militarization.
However, to avoid mixing the two 
concepts, I would point out that military build-
up is not the only emergency method used by 
the state to respond to an existential threat. 
According to Rita Floyd (2015), the emergency 
measures refer to those measures which are 
not possible within non-emergency situation, 
either by executive unilateralism (Williams, 
2003; Neal, 2010) or by the legislature passing 
new laws granting new authority which are 
not possible within existing, non-emergency 
legislation (Sarat, 2010). The measures can 
involve all state’s security apparatus, not just 
the military.
Securitization of Public Health
One of the issues which have traditionally 
not been a security issue, but have been 
securitized, is public health. At first, scholars 
such as Richard Ullman (1983) redefined the 
concept of security more broadly to include 
the potential impact of a pandemic on the 
global economy, socio-political stability, and 
international relations. Then, public health 
security studies developed as states and 
international organizations inserted the human 
security agenda into their foreign and security 
policy.
Securitization of public health issues 
has happened due to the spread of infectious 
diseases, especially to the West (Pirages, 1997; 
Price-Smith, 2001; 2009); the impact of HIV/
AIDS, especially on the stability of the country 
(Elbe, 2002; Heinecken, 2003; McInnes, 2006; 
McInnes & Rushton, 2010; McInnes, 2011); and 
the risk of bioterrorism (Garrett, 2001; Strongin 
& Redhead, 2001; Graham, 2008). 
Scholars have agreed that there are benefits 
of securitizing health issue: on the security side, 
public health experts bring valuable tools and 
expertise to a number of new problems, while 
on the health side, public health securitization 
raises its political profile leading to the prospect 
of greater resources devoted to urgent health 
needs. However, scholars also argue that 
securitization of public health issues is also 
problematic. First, it makes national security 
actors control the agenda of public health. 
Second, it leads to relatively narrow health 
problems which are considered as part of the 
national security agenda. Third, it puts national 
security perspective above human security 
dimension (Elbe, 2006; McInnes & Lee, 2006). 
Therefore, despite securitization of public 
health issues may increase attention to health 
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issues and political support for suppressing the 
health problems, scholars also warn against the 
risks of subordinating health issues to national 
security needs.
Securitization (and Militarization) in 
Indonesia
Scholars have used securitization theory 
to explain various cases of Indonesia’s security 
policy, including the South China Sea disputes 
(Meyer, Nurmandi, & Agustiyara, 2019), the 
Aceh insurgency (Geri, 2018; Kurniawan, 
2018), the Maluku conflict (Kurniawan, 2018), 
terrorism (Van Damme, 2008; Febrica, 2010), 
illicit drugs (Widiyono, 2018), migrants and 
refugees (Zayzda, Ash-Shafikh, & Kusuma, 
2019), migrant workers (Arifianto, 2009), as 
well as online hoaxes (Lee, 2020). However, 
there is still a lack of literature on public health 
securitization in Indonesia, which this article 
seeks to fill the gap.
Related to securitization in Indonesia, 
scholars have also discussed the militarization 
of Indonesian government in post-Suharto 
democratic Indonesia, especially during Jokowi 
administration. President Jokowi has been 
heavily relying on active-duty and retired 
military figures, giving the military perspective 
greater influence on policy issues. The Armed 
Forces (TNI) has also gained relatively greater 
influence during Jokowi administration. TNI 
has been involved in non-military domains, 
including counterterrorism (Singh, 2016), 
food security, wildfire, and various other 
civil domains (Gunawan, 2017; Sebastian, 
Syailendra, & Marzuki, 2018; Laksmana, 
2019a; Laksmana, 2019b). Scholars have 
argued that it happened because Jokowi is a 
president without his own political party and 
therefore needs the support of a wider national 
security establishment to carry out his agenda 
(Laksmana, 2019a). This article also touches 
upon militarization in Indonesia, especially 
on how the securitization of the government’s 
COVID-19 measures had been fed from the 
ongoing militarization of the government, and 
how the public health securitization had been 
enabling the continuation of the militarization.
Methods
This article discusses the Indonesian 
government’s measures to the COVID-19 
pandemic in January to May 2020 using 
securitization theory as discussed above. It 
explains how the government, as the securitizing 
actor, de-securitized the pandemic in January 
to February 2020 and then securitized the 
issue in March to May 2020 by looking at the 
speech acts and facilitating conditions in the 
de-securitizing and securitizing attempts.
In analyzing the speech act, this article 
uses content analysis to explain whether 
the language used by the government in the 
securitizing attempts are assertive, directive, 
commissive, expressive, and declaration, 
as classified by Searle (1975), Vanderveken 
(2002), and Vuori (2008). The author chooses 
to use content analysis to enable examining the 
patterns in the government’s communication 
about the COVID-19 measures.
The government’s communication 
analyzed in this study is obtained from official 
communication channels of the government 
ministries and agencies related to the COVID-19 
measures, including web sites and social media:
This article also uses data from secondary 
sources which are publicly accessible, 
including media sources. To validate the 
data obtained from non-official government 
sources, the author checked the correctness and 
meaningfulness of all data by triangulating it 
with several sources. Due to self-quarantine 
amid social/physical distancing during the 
pandemic, the author did not collect primary 
data using surveys or interviews.
Results
January to February 2020: Lack of Response
The first COVID-19 cases in Indonesia 
were confirmed on 2 March 2020, but experts 
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had been warning that the coronavirus might 
have already existed undetected in Indonesia 
since January. For example, in January 
2020, Chairman of the Eijkman Institute for 
Molecular Biology in Central Jakarta, Prof. 
Amin Soebandrio, said that Indonesia lacked 
the specific reagents to detect the virus (The 
Age, 2020, January 31; Sydney Morning Herald, 
2020, January 31). In February 2020, Chairman 
of the Indonesian Red Cross Society (PMI), 
Jusuf Kalla, said that the disease might have 
entered Indonesia, but Indonesian people 
might not recognize the symptoms (The New 
York Times, 2020, February 11). A study by 
Pablo M. De Salazar et al. (2020) also concluded 
that the coronavirus could have arrived in 
Indonesia and Cambodia due to direct flights 
from Wuhan during the outbreak.
However, the Indonesian government 
denied these warnings and tended to show 
no sense of crisis or even to underestimate 
the threat of coronavirus, until February 
2020. For example, on 7 February 2020, the 
Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and 
Security Affairs, Mahfud MD, announced that 
Indonesia was the only major country in Asia 
that did not yet have a positive case of the 
coronavirus (CNN Indonesia, 2020, February 
7). On 11 February 2020, the Minister of Health, 
Terawan, discredited the study by De Salazar 
et al., challenging the researchers to come to 
Indonesia to directly prove the results of their 
research (CNN Indonesia, 2020, February 11). 
On 26 February 2020, Vice President Ma’ruf 
Amin (hereinafter Ma’ruf ) said that the 
coronavirus did not dare to come to Indonesia 
because of the prayers and istigasah (a form of 
Islamic prayer) of the ulama (Muslim scholars) 
(Tempo, 2020, February 27). Some of the 
statements that underestimated the COVID-19 
issue in this period are summarized in Table 2.
In facing this public health issue, the 
government seemed more concerned of the 
economic dimension, especially of the impacts 
on the tourism and aviation industries. For 
example, on 24 February 2020, the Coordinating 
Minister for Economic Affairs, Airlangga 
Hartarto (hereinafter Airlangga), announced 
that the government would budget IDR 
72 billion for influencers to encourage the 
tourism sector, IDR 98.5 billion for airlines and 
travel agents, IDR 103 billion for promotional 
activities, and IDR 25 billion for tourism 
activities (Liputan 6, 2020, February 26). On 
25 February 2020, the Minister of Finance, 
Sri Mulyani, announced that the government 
would provide a stimulus package worth IDR 
10.3 trillion, which focused on the tourism, 
Table 1.
Sources of Government’s Communication Analyzed
Government Institutions Web Sites Social Media (Twitter) of Institutions and Office Holders
President https://www.presidenri.go.id/ @jokowi
Cabinet Secretariat https://setkab.go.id/ @setkabgoid




Ministry of Health https://www.kemkes.go.id/ @KemenkesRI
Ministry of Transportation http://dephub.go.id/ @kemenhub151
@BudiKaryaS
Ministry of Finance https://www.kemenkeu.go.id/ @KemenkeuRI
Police (Polri) https://www.polri.go.id/ @DivHumas_Polri
BNPB https://bnpb.go.id/ @BNPB_Indonesia
Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysical 
Agency (BMKG)
https://www.bmkg.go.id/ @infoBMKG
COVID-19 Mitigation Acceleration Task Force https://covid19.go.id/
Source: Author
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airline, and housing sector (Kemenkeu, 2020, 
February 26). Some of the statements which 
are more concerned of economic aspects in 
dealing with covid-19 issues in this period are 
summarized in Table 3.
As discussed above, in January to 
February 2020 the Indonesian government 
seemed to be trying to de-securitize the 
COVID-19 pandemic, in the form of silencing. 
It is indicated by the fact that the issue failed 
to register in the government’s security 
discourse. In fact, this article views that the 
government might have strived for a strategy 
of exclusion, when there are other security and 
political issues which the government needed 
to address. For example, in this period the 
government was preoccupied with tension 
with China in the Natuna waters, issue of 
repatriation of former Indonesian foreign 
terrorist fighters from the Middle East, flash 
floods throughout Jakarta metropolitan area, 
alleged corruption in state-owned insurance 
company PT Asuransi Jiwasraya, as well as the 
Omnibus Bill on Job Creation. As illustration 
of how the last example might have led the 
government to exclude the pandemic issue, on 
15 February 2020 the Coordinating Minister for 
Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Mahfud 
Table 2.
Indonesian Government Officials’ Statements Which Underestimated COVID-19 
Issue, Until February 2020
Date Government Officials Statements Sources
2020, 
January 27
Minister of Health, Terawan “The prevention of coronavirus is to not 
panic and fret, just ‘enjoy’ it, and eat 
sufficiently”.




Coordinating Minister for 
Political, Legal and Security 
Affairs, Mahfud MD
“Indonesia is the only major country in 
Asia that does not yet have a positive 
case of the coronavirus”.




Minister of Health, Terawan Discredited the study that concluded 
that the coronavirus should already exist 
undetected in Indonesia and challenged 
the researchers to come to Indonesia 
to directly prove the results of their 
research.




Coordinating Minister for 
Political, Legal and Security 
Affairs, Mahfud MD
“The coronavirus cannot enter Indonesia 






Minister of Transportation, 
Budi Karya Sumadi
“There is no coronavirus in Indonesia 
because the people are immune from 






Secretary of the Directorate 
General of Disease Prevention 
and Control of the Ministry of 
Health, Achmad Yurianto
Said that the Japanese citizen who tested 
positive for the SARS-CoV-2 virus 
after returning from a trip to Indonesia 
was not a COVID-19 case, insisting 
that SARS-CoV-2 was different from 
COVID-19.
(Note: COVID-19 is the name of the 
disease, while SARS-CoV-2 is the name 
of the virus that caused it.)
The Jakarta Post (The 




Vice President Ma’ruf “The coronavirus does not dare to come 
to Indonesia because of the prayer and 
istigasah of the ulama, Muslim scholars”.




Main Expert Staff of 
Presidential Staff Office (KSP), 
Ali Mochtar Ngabalin
“There is no coronavirus in Indonesia 
because it does not develop strongly in 
tropical countries”.
Tribun News (2020, 
February 29)
Source: collected from various media sources
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MD, tweeted, “The coronavirus cannot enter 
Indonesia due to complicated licensing. But 
the Omnibus Bill on Job Creation needs to 
continue” (Mahfud MD (@mohmahfudmd), 
2020, February 15).
Despite the initial de-securitization, there 
are also forms of speech acts related to the 
COVID-19 pandemic in this period, in the form 
of declaration. For example, on 28 January 2020 
the Chief of BNPB, Lt. Gen. Doni, issued Chief 
of BNPB Decree No. A of 2020, which declared 
the status of coronavirus disease outbreak 
disaster emergency in Indonesia. Then, on 4 
February 2020 the Minister of Health Terawan 
issued Minister of Health Decree No. HK.01.07/
Menkes/104/2020, which declared the novel 
coronavirus infection as a disease that could cause 
a plague. However, there are no other forms of 
speech acts (assertive, directive, nor commissive) 
related to the pandemic in this period which 
could construct the issue as a threat. Even not 
all the declaration is presented to the audience; 
for example, the Chief of BNPB Decree was only 
informed to the public on 17 March 2020, seven 
weeks after it was initially issued.
M a r c h  t o  M a y  2 0 2 0 :  P u b l i c  H e a l t h 
Securitization
The first COVID-19 cases in Indonesia 
were confirmed on 2 March 2020. As of 31 May 
Table 3.
Indonesian Government Officials’ Statements Which Are More Concerned of 
Economic Aspects in Dealing with COVID-19 Issues, Until February 2020
Date Government Officials Statements Sources
2020, 
February 07
Special Staff of the 
Minister of Transportation, 
Adita Irawati
The government had asked domestic airlines to 
offer cheaper flight tickets to Bali, North Sulawesi, 
and Bintan to anticipate the decline in tourists 
from China.




Minister of Transportation, 
Budi Karya Sumadi
The government was considering incentives for 
the tourism and aviation industry, including 
cutting the amount of non-tax revenue collection, 
instructing airport authority companies PT 
Angkasa Pura I and II to lower landing costs, and 






President Jokowi The government was considering providing 
incentives for tourists and travel agents.




President Jokowi The government decided to intensify investment 
to spur economic growth.




Coordinating Minister for 
Maritime and Investment 
Affairs, Luhut Binsar 
Pandjaitan
Wanted foreign workers from China to return 






Minister of Transportation, 
Budi Karya Sumadi
The government would provide financial 
assistance measures to revitalize the economy and 
support airline operators.





for Economic Affairs, 
Airlangga
The government would budget IDR 72 billion for 
influencers to encourage the tourism sector, IDR 
98.5 billion for airlines and travel agents, IDR 
103 billion for promotional activities, and IDR 25 
billion for tourism activities.




President Jokowi The government gave discounts on plane ticket 
prices and exempted hotel and restaurant taxes.




Minister of Finance, Sri 
Mulyani
The government would provide a stimulus 
package worth IDR 10.3 trillion, which focuses on 
the tourism, airline, and housing sector.
Kemenkeu (2020, 
February 26)
Source: collected from various media sources
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2020, there are 26,473 confirmed COVID-19 
cases in the country, of which 7,308 have been 
declared cured, while 1,613 have died. The 
Java Island, especially Jakarta Province, is the 
most affected by this pandemic. However, the 
disease has spread to all 34 provinces.
Riyanti Djalante et al. (2020) has provided 
a detailed review and analysis of the responses 
to COVID-19 in Indonesia from January to 
March 2020, including the government’s, 
non-governmental organizations’ and the 
community’s responses. In reporting the 
government’s response, Djalante et al. includes 
all related government ministries and agencies: 
the COVID-19 Mitigation Acceleration Task 
Force, National Disaster Management Agency 
(BNPB), Ministry of Health, Ministry of 
Finance, Bank Indonesia (BI), TNI, Polri, as 
well as Ministry of Villages, Development of 
Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration. 
While Djalante et al.’s article discusses the 
overall government’s COVID-19 measures, this 
article focuses on the measures which might 
be seen as the emergency measures in the 
securitization of COVID-19, including health 
response and economic mitigation, in March 
to May 2020.
In terms of  heal th response,  the 
government is implementing large-scale social 
restrictions (PSBB) and strict physical distancing 
to restrict the spread of the pandemic. PSBB is 
regulated in the Minister of Health Regulation 
No. 9 of 2020, which was issued on 3 April 2020. 
Governors or regents and mayors can propose 
PSBB in their regions to the Minister of Health 
for approval. By 31 May 2020, the Minister of 
Health Terawan had approved province wide 
PSBB in Jakarta Province (approved on 7 April 
2020), West Sumatra Province (17 April 2020), 
Gorontalo Province (28 April 2020), and West 
Java Province (1 May 2020), as well as PSBB in 37 
regencies and cities. However, on 21 May 2020, 
the government announced that Indonesia had 
entered the new normal condition, relaxing the 
PSBB (Detik, 2020, May 21).
Meanwhile,  in terms of economic 
mitigation, the government is implementing 
several social protections, tax stimulus and 
Figure 1.
Indonesia Cumulative COVID-19 Data (as of 31 May 2020)
Source: COVID-19 Task Force, 2020
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other economic measures. For example, on 31 
March 2020 President Jokowi announced an 
additional state budget of IDR 405.1 trillion, 
of which IDR 75 trillion will be allocated for 
health expenditure, IDR 110 trillion for social 
protection, IDR 70.1 trillion for tax incentives 
and stimulus for people’s business credit 
(KUR), and IDR 150 trillion for financing 
the national economic recovery program 
(Presiden RI, 2020, March 31). On 14 April 
2020, the government announced exemption 
of value-added tax (PPN) and income tax 
(PPh) (Setkab, 2020, April 14). On 21 April 
2020, President Jokowi announced the ban on 
mudik (homecoming to hometown or village 
during major holidays, especially Eid al-Fitr) 
(Presiden RI, 2020, April 21). On 22 April 
2020, the Coordinating Minister for Economic 
Affairs, Airlangga, announced an additional 
tax stimulus of IDR 35.3 trillion for 18 sectors 
(Setkab, 2020, April 22).
Discussion
Amid the health response and economic 
mitigation, there are three characteristics of 
public health securitization that we can observe 
from the Indonesian government’s measures 
to control the COVID-19 pandemic: (1) the 
over-reliance on influential military figures 
and national security actors, (2) the tendency 
to downgrade the threats, and (3) lack of 
transparency.
Over-Reliance on Influential Military Figures 
and National Security Actors
The over-reliance on influential military 
figures might come from the fact that there are 
several retired military and police figures in 
the current Indonesian cabinet. The military 
and police figures in the current cabinet were 
appointed at the start of this administration 
term before the COVID-19 pandemic and thus 
their appointment had nothing to do with the 
current securitization of the pandemic and 
more to do with political negotiations at the 
time. As Laksmana (2019a) has pointed out, 
Jokowi’s reliance on those figures has been 
fueled by his need for support from the wider 
national security establishment to carry out his 
agenda. However, Yağanoğlu (2006, pp. 24-30) 
has argued that securitization is fed from prior 
militarization. Therefore, it is important to 
identify the military and police figures who had 
been influencing the government’s decision-
making process with military perspective since 
before the pandemic.
Arguably, the most influential military 
figure in the current cabinet is the Coordinating 
Minister for Maritime and Investment Affairs, 
Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan (hereinafter Luhut). 
He is a retired four-star general whose military 
service included the Army’s Special Forces 
Command (Kopassus), where he became the 
founding commander of its counter-terrorism 
unit, Detachment 81 (now Sat-81/Gultor). His 
deputy at the time was Prabowo Subianto 
(hereinafter Prabowo), currently the Minister 
of Defense. Prabowo’s peak military career 
included being the General Commander of 
Kopassus and Commander of the Army’s 
Strategic Command (Kostrad). The Minister 
of Religious Affairs, Fachrul Razi (hereinafter 
Fachrul), is also a retired four-star general who 
was the Deputy Commander of TNI in 1999–
2000. The Minister of Health, Terawan, was a 
military doctor who headed the Gatot Soebroto 
Army Hospital until his appointment in the 
current cabinet. The Chief of the Presidential 
Staff Office (KSP), Moeldoko, is another retired 
four-star general who was the Commander of 
TNI in 2013–2015. Meanwhile, the Minister 
of Home Affairs, Tito Karnavian (hereinafter 
Tito), is a retired police-general who was the 
Chief of Polri until his appointment in the 
current cabinet.
Several of these retired generals have 
used the grammar of security in describing 
the government’s measures to the COVID-19 
pandemic. For example, on 21 April 2020, 
when journalists asked why the government 
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had only then decided to ban mudik, the 
Coordinating Minister for Maritime and 
Investment Affairs, Luhut, explained that the 
government decided to take gradual steps, 
which is “a military strategy” (Detik, 2020, 
April 21). The next day, when criticized for the 
lack of inter-ministerial coordination, Minister 
Luhut denied it saying he was “educated in the 
military”, wherein there is tight coordination 
between the commanders and staff (Tribun 
News, 2020, April 22). Meanwhile, on 28 April 
2020 the Minister of Defense, Prabowo, likened 
the government’s measures to the COVID-19 
pandemic to “a war against an invisible enemy 
which has no ideology and no other agenda 
than to threaten human safety” (Kumparan, 
2020, April 28).
As Yağanoğlu (2006, pp. 24-30) again has 
argued, securitization enables the continuation 
of militarization. Similarly, the securitization 
of COVID-19 pandemic has strengthened the 
militarization by giving way to several military 
elements in the Indonesian government’s 
measures to the COVID-19 pandemic. For 
example, the spokesman of COVID-19 Task 
Force, who was appointed on 3 March 2020, 
is the Secretary of the Directorate General of 
Disease Prevention and Control of the Ministry 
of Health, Achmad Yurianto (hereinafter 
Yurianto), who was also a military physician. 
Meanwhile, the government’s COVID-19 
Mitigation Acceleration Task Force, established 
on 13 March 2020, is led by the Chief of BNPB, 
Lt. Gen. Doni, who is an active three-star 
general whose military service included being 
the General Commander of Kopassus.
The COVID-19 Task Force which Lt. Gen. 
Doni leads is under and responsible directly 
to the President. It has a steering committee 
and an executive committee, with a secretariat 
at the BNPB. It was reorganized a week after 
its establishment and gained more ministries 
and agencies to increase coordination. It 
also coordinates local COVID-19 task forces 
established by local leaders (governors, regents, 
and mayors). The national Task Force also 
involves many military figures. Among the 
members of its steering committee are the 
retired military figures of the cabinet: Terawan, 
Tito, Prabowo, Fachrul, and Moeldoko. Aside 
from ministers, there are also Chief of the State 
Intelligence Agency (BIN) Budi Gunawan, 
Commander of TNI A.C.M. Hadi Tjahjanto, and 
Chief of Polri Pol. Gen. Idham Azis. Meanwhile, 
among those under Lt. Gen. Doni’s command 
in the executive committee are the Operations 
Assistant of the Commander of TNI and the 
Operations Assistant of the Chief of Polri as 
deputy chairpersons. The organization of the 
COVID-19 Task Force is summarized in Table 4.
Meanwhile, the COVID-19 Task Forces at 
the local level also involve security actors. The 
task forces are led by governors at the province 
level and regents or mayors at the regency or 
city levels. As with the national COVID-19 
Task Force, the military and police elements 
are appointed as deputy chairpersons of the 
local task forces. The organization of the local 
COVID-19 Task Force is summarized in Table 5.
At least three national security agencies 
are deeply involved in the government’s 
COVID-19 measures: TNI, Polri and BIN. 
TNI’s supposed role in the government’s 
COVID-19 measures is to provide assets to 
support the COVID-19 Task Force in terms of 
logistics, supply and transport. By 11 April 
2020, TNI was confirmed to have distributed 
medical equipment to all provincial capitals, 
led by the Deputy Operations Assistant of 
the Commander of TNI (Antara, 2020, April 
11). On 23 March 2020, TNI announced 
the formation of four Integrated Joint Task 
Commands (Kogasgabad) as sub-units of the 
government’s COVID-19 Task Force (Kompas, 
2020, March 23). They were involved in the 
preparation of COVID-19 emergency hospitals 
in Kemayoran, Jakarta and Galang Island, Riau 
Islands. Meanwhile, Polri’s supposed role is to 
enforce social distancing and other mitigation 
measures. On 19 March 2020, Chief of Polri, Pol. 
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Table 4.
Organization of the Indonesian Government’s COVID-19 Task Force
Structures 13–19 March 2020 Since 20 March 2020
Steering 
Committee
•	 Coordinating Minister for Human 
Development and Cultural Affairs
•	 Coordinating Minister for Political, 
Legal, and Security Affairs
•	 Minister of Health
•	 Minister of Finance
•	 Chairperson: Coordinating Minister for Human 
Development and Cultural Affairs
•	 Deputy Chairpersons:
o Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and 
Security Affairs
o Minister of Health
•	 Secretary: Minister of Finance
•	 Members: Chief executives of 26 ministries and 
agencies as well as governors throughout Indonesia
Executive 
Committee
•	 Chairperson: Chief of BNPB
•	 Deputy Chairpersons:
o Operations Assistant of the 
Commander of TNI
o Operations Assistant of the Chief of 
Polri
Members: Elements of 12 ministries 
and agencies
•	 Chairperson: Chief of BNPB
•	 Deputy Chairpersons:
o Secretary General of the Ministry of Health
o Secretary of the Minister of State-Owned 
Enterprises
o Secretary General of National Resilience 
Council (Wantannas)
o Operations Assistant of the Commander of TNI
o Operations Assistant of the Chief of Polri
•	 Members: Elements of 33 ministries and agencies
Source: Presidential Decree No. 7 of 2020 and Presidential Decree No. 9 of 2020
Table 5.
Organization of the Local COVID-19 Task Forces
Structures Province-Level Regency/City-Level
Chairperson Governor Regent/Mayor
Deputy Chairpersons •	 Commander of Regional Military 
Command (Kodam) or Military Area 
Command (Korem)
•	 Chief Regional Police (Polda)
•	 Commander of Military District 
Command (Kodim) or Military District 
Command Sector (Koramil)
•	 Chief of Departmental Police (Polres)
Secretariat Regional Disaster Management Agency 
(BPBD)
Regional Disaster Management Agency 
(BPBD)
Members Elements of various local government 
offices and agencies
Elements of various local government 
offices and agencies
Source: Minister of Home Affairs Circular No. 440/2622/SJ dated 29 March 2020
Gen. Idham Azis, issued Chief of Polri Notice 
No. Mak/2/III/2020 to prohibit social activities 
that could create crowds. Since then, until 12 
April 2020, Polri claimed to have dissolved as 
many as 205,502 mass gatherings across the 
country (Kompas, 2020, April 13). Finally, BIN’s 
supposed role is to conduct contact tracing to 
track the spread of COVID-19.
While  the  TNI,  Polr i ,  and BIN’s 
involvement in the COVID-19 measures is 
necessary, soon their roles extend beyond the 
supposed roles. For example, TNI – not public 
health authorities – operates the COVID-19 
emergency hospitals in Kemayoran, Jakarta 
and Galang Island, Riau Islands, despite the 
commanders having no medical background. 
However, it is fair to say that the TNI has not been 
the definitive leading actor of the COVID-19 
measures. Evan A. Laksmana and Rage 
Taufika (2020) even argued that the TNI as an 
organizational actor was not yet fully mobilized, 
finding that the various TNI operations thus 
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the COVID-19 pandemic, BIN established a 
medical intelligence unit and recruited medical 
personnel volunteers for handling COVID-19, 
who were inaugurated on 22 April 2020. Since 
then, BIN has conducted several COVID-19 
tests, including in Kendal Tunnel area, Central 
Jakarta (CNN Indonesia, 2020, May 6), and 
Dukuh Atas area, South Jakarta on 6 May 2020 
(Okezone, 2020, May 6); in Blok M MRT Station, 
South Jakarta on 8 May 2020 (Viva, 2020, May 
8); in Pondok Aren district, South Tangerang 
on 14–15 May 2020 (RMOL Banten, 2020, May 
15); in several areas in Surabaya starting 29 
May 2020 (Tribun News, 2020 May, 29); and 
in Ciledug CBD area, Tangerang on 31 May 
2020 (Tribun News, 2020, May 30). Aside from 
conducting tests, BIN also sprayed disinfectants 
to several areas and educated the community 
on the dangers of COVID-19.
BIN’s role in the COVID-19 measures is 
problematic because of three reasons: First, BIN 
did not have specialization in epidemiology 
and public health. Therefore, the fact that they 
made a modeling of COVID-19 is something 
that is out of their competence, let alone 
claiming that the prediction is accurate. Second, 
even if we assume that BIN has competence in 
making predictions of COVID-19, intelligence 
work should only be delivered to the President 
as a single client; it should be confidential and 
not open to the public. Therefore, the act of 
announcing their prediction of COVID-19 to 
the public is contrary to BIN’s very essence as 
an intelligence agency. Third, as an intelligence 
agency, BIN’s actions should be clandestine; its 
role in the COVID-19 measures is no exception. 
Therefore, even if they are conducting tests 
and other actions in public, BIN should not 
publicly put out their name and cover their 
acts on behalf of the name of other institutions.
Tendency to Downgrade the Threats
The over-reliance on influential military 
figures and the national security agencies might 
be related to the tendency of the Indonesian 
far in support of the government’s COVID-19 
measures only utilized a small number and 
localized military assets and personnel.
On the other hand, Polri’s role extends to 
crackdown against criticism of the government. 
On 4 April 2020, Chief of Polri, Pol. Gen. Idham 
Azis, issued Telegram Letter No. ST/1100/IV/
HUK.7.1.2020 containing law enforcement 
guidelines in dealing with criminal activities 
amid the COVID-19 pandemic, which listed 
insult to the president and government officials 
as one of the crimes in cyberspace. They will use 
the Criminal Code (KUHP) Article 207 against 
offenders – a problematic article that is widely 
described as a “rubber provision”, meaning that 
it can be broadly interpreted and tends to weaken 
human rights protection. On 13 April 2020, Polri 
said that there were already two people named as 
suspects of insulting the president (Antara, 2020, 
April 13). On April 23, the police arrested Ravio 
Patra, a public policy researcher and democracy 
activist who had been critical of the government, 
due to a message sent from his WhatsApp 
number, which he claimed was hacked (CNN 
Indonesia, 2020, April 23). He was freed the next 
day, after undergoing an investigation and being 
named a witness in the case. These crackdowns 
hint that the government is not only fighting 
the pandemic, but also defending the political 
regime.
BIN’s extended role is arguably the most 
problematic. For example, on 13 March 2020, BIN 
announced that they had made a modelling of the 
spread of COVID-19, which predicted that the 
peak would occur in May, making intelligence 
data a public domain (Detik, 2020, March 13). On 
6 April 2020, Chief of COVID-19 Task Force, Lt. 
Gen. Doni, announced that BIN’s prediction on 
the number of COVID-19 cases was “99 percent 
accurate” (Tirto, 2020, April 6). Amid concern 
of a very low testing rate in Indonesia, there is a 
growing suspicion that the government is basing 
its testing rate on BIN’s prediction.
Prior to the pandemic, BIN did not have 
an entity tasked with health intelligence. Amid 
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government to downgrade the COVID-19 
threats. As previously described, at first the 
government denied experts’ warning that the 
coronavirus might already exist undetected 
in Indonesia. Even after the pandemic has 
spread in Indonesia, the government still tries 
to minimize it by claiming that the virus will 
become weaker during the dry season. For 
example, on 2 April 2020, Coordinating Minister 
for Maritime and Investment Affairs, Luhut, 
said that the coronavirus could not survive 
in Indonesian hot weather (Kompas, 2020, 
April 2). It was followed by the Meteorology, 
Climatology, and Geophysical Agency (BMKG), 
which on 4 April 2020 announced that the 
agency’s study confirmed that Indonesian 
weather and climate conditions and the 
archipelagic geography made the country at 
relatively lower risk of COVID-19 (BMKG, 
2020). The Indonesian Medical Association 
(IDI) immediately declined the claim (Kompas, 
2020, April 3), while subsequently the media 
also published fact-checking articles which 
deny it (Kumparan, 2020, April 3; Tempo, 2020, 
April 6; Tirto, 2020, April 8).
The tendency to downgrade the threats 
might also be observed from the limited efforts 
to contain the spread of COVID-19. Indonesia 
has a very low COVID-19 testing rate, with 
a total of 223,624 people tested or only 835 
tests in every million people as of 31 May 
2020 (Worldometer, 2020). According to the 
spokesman of COVID-19 Task Force, Yurianto, 
the low rate is due to the government not 
performing tests based on population size but 
on positive case contact tracking and on visits 
to health facilities by people with symptoms. 
To be fair, the testing rate has improved after 
the government prepared more PCR sample 
test laboratories, as announced on 13 April 2020 
(Setkab, 2020, April 13).
Another indicator of the limited efforts 
is the Indonesian government’s refusal to 
implement lockdown like in other countries. 
President Jokowi has argued that Indonesia’s 
character is different from the countries 
which have succeeded doing lockdown (CNN 
Indonesia, 2020, March 24), and the government 
prefers the enforcement of physical distancing 
in public involving the TNI and Polri (Jakarta 
Globe, 2020, March 23). Meanwhile, Chief 
of COVID-19 Task Force, Lt. Gen. Doni, also 
announced that the central government 
considered the lockdown policy implemented 
by several other countries had failed (Liputan 
6, 2020, March 30).
Even after several local governments such 
as Tegal, Tasikmalaya, and Papua announced 
local lockdowns, on 29 March 2020 the central 
government responded that the local lockdown 
had no legal basis (Kumparan, 2020, March 
29), and the central government was still 
drafting a government regulation (PP) which 
regulates when local governments can set 
local quarantine (Kompas, 2020, March 27). 
Following that, on 30 March 2020 President 
Jokowi announced the implementation of 
large-scale social restrictions (PSBB) and strict 
physical distancing. If the situation worsens 
significantly, the government will declare a 
civil emergency (CNN Indonesia, 2020, March 
30).
Even the implementation of PSBB policy 
is delayed by bureaucratic red tape because 
local governments may only apply the PSBB 
after receiving approval from the Minister 
of Health. For example, after the Jakarta 
government submitted proposal to apply 
the PSBB status in the province, the central 
government initially returned the proposal and 
asked them to complete several data, and only 
approved PSBB in Jakarta a week later, after 
being pressured by health experts (Tempo, 
2020, April 8). Not all PSBB proposals have 
been approved: The Minister of Health had 
rejected the proposals of Rote Ndao Regency, 
Palangka Raya, Sorong, Bolaang Mongondow 
Regency, and Gorontalo City. According to the 
spokesman of COVID-19 Task Force, Yurianto, 
PSBB will only be approved if the region has 
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become the epicenter area (Kompas, 2020, 
April 16).
Lack of Transparency
Finally, instead of upholding transparency 
of COVID-19 data in Indonesia, at first the 
Indonesian government deliberately withheld 
information. On 13 March 2020, President 
Jokowi argued that lack of transparency is 
necessary to prevent people from panicking 
(Presiden RI, 2020, March 13). The spokesman 
of COVID-19 Task Force, Yurianto, also said 
that the government indeed controls which 
information is provided to the public (Merdeka, 
2020, March 17). A month after admitting the 
deliberate lack of transparency, finally on 13 
April 2020, President Jokowi instructed that 
all COVID-19 data must be open for access 
(Presiden RI, 2020, April 13).
Despite the course correction after a 
month, the initial lack of transparency had 
eroded public trust. This happened because 
the COVID-19 data presented by the central 
government does not match some local 
governments’ data. For example, the number 
of COVID-19 deaths in Banten and Jakarta on 
20 March 2020 as announced by the central 
government and the respective provincial 
governments was different. Similarly, the 
number of COVID-19 cases in Yogyakarta 
on the same day as announced by the central 
government and the Yogyakarta government 
was also different (Detik, 2020, March 20). 
Initially, the spokesman of COVID-19 Task 
Force, Yurianto, argued that the difference was 
due to the central government grouping case 
data by province based on the location of the 
hospital where each patient was treated or died, 
not based on the address at the patient’s ID card 
(Detik, 2020, March 20). However, the media 
kept scrutinizing the difference, especially 
in regard of COVID-19 mortality data in the 
Jakarta Province (Jawa Pos, 2020, March 30). 
Finally, the BNPB spokesperson acknowledged 
that the difference occurred because the data 
input from the Ministry of Health, which was 
referred by the COVID-19 Task Force, was also 
limited (Tempo, 2020, April 5).
As discussed above, since the first cases 
were confirmed in March 2020 the Indonesian 
government has securitized the COVID-19 
pandemic. There are various forms of speech 
acts related to the COVID-19 pandemic in this 
period: assertive speech acts in the forms of 
statements and explanations of the data of 
COVID-19 in Indonesia; directive speech acts 
in the forms of orders and requests of PSBB and 
physical distancing, as well as the ban on mudik; 
commissive speech acts in the forms of vows 
and threats of sanctions for violation of PSBB 
order and the mudik ban; expressive speech 
acts in the forms of statements of “military 
strategy” and “war against an invisible enemy”; 
and finally declarations of various policies 
and regulations that the government took as 
measures to the pandemic. The speech acts 
are accompanied with emergency measures, 
including the reliance on military figures and 
national security actors, as well as lack of 
transparency. Unfortunately, the government’s 
tendency to downgrade the threats limited 
the efficacy of their limited efforts to contain 
the spread of COVID-19. As of 31 May 2020, 
Indonesia recorded the second highest cases in 
Southeast Asia and the highest deaths (WHO, 
2020).
It is fair to say that the audience did 
not accept the government’s securitization 
of the COVID-19 pandemic due to lack of 
facilitating conditions. First, the government’s 
grammar of security was complicated because 
of the tendency to downgrade the threats. 
Second, the government’s social capital was 
low due to the lack of transparency. Third, 
the audience’s condition was not ideal to 
accept the security discourse and justify the 
government’s emergency measures to the 
pandemic (PSBB and physical distancing) 
because of the various human insecurities they 
faced amid the enforcement of those measures, 
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including financial loss due to unemployment 
and hunger due to food insecurity.
Finally, it is important to note that the 
securitization of the COVID-19 pandemic is not 
typical of Indonesia, but a global phenomenon 
(Nunes, 2020; Daoudi, 2020). Scholars have also 
studied other governments’ securitization of 
the COVID-19 pandemic at home, such as in 
Brazil (Hoffmann Pfrimer & Barbosa Jr., 2020), 
the United Kingdom (Stott, West, & Harrison, 
2020), Hungary (Molnár, Takács, & Harnos, 
2020), China (Liu & Bennett, 2020), as well as 
in regions such as Europe (Vankovska, 2020), 
the Middle East (Hoffman, 2020), and Southeast 
Asia (Baysa-Barredo, 2020).
In the Southeast Asian region, the 
Philippines experience provided arguably 
the most similar case with Indonesia. The 
Philippine government has also been over-
reliant on influential military and police 
figures in its COVID-19 response, as well as 
on national security agencies, especially the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the 
Philippine National Police (PNP). Arguably 
even worse than the Indonesian case, the 
Philippine government has been criticized for 
violation of basic civil liberties and human 
rights in their COVID-19 measures (Vallejo Jr. 
& Ong, 2020, p. 6). President Rodrigo Duterte 
infamously ordered AFP and PNP to shoot 
dead protesters who breached quarantine rules 
(Amnesty International, 2020), as well as other 
statements which undermined human security. 
Indeed, analysts have pointed out the similarity 
between Indonesia’s and the Philippines’ 
COVID-19 securitization and militarization 
(Chandran, 2020; Esmaquel II, 2020).
The comparison shows that Indonesia 
is not a unique case. However, Indonesia 
still provides a good case for the study of 
public health securitization, especially the 
COVID-19 pandemic, due to its geographical 
and population size as well as militarized 
government. With 17,508 officially listed 
islands, Indonesia is the world’s largest island 
country in the world, making it arguably easier 
to restrict the spread of the coronavirus from 
one island with confirmed cases to other islands 
by measures like border closures. The military 
influence on the government should also make 
them more effective at restricting the pandemic 
spread with maximum coercion. Nevertheless, 
the virus persisted spreading to all major 
islands and 34 provinces. This makes the study 
of the Indonesian case, albeit not distinctive, 
still an important one.
Conclusion
As discussed above, the Indonesian 
government has been unable to respond 
proportionate to the threat of COVID-19 
because, until February 2020, the government 
tried to de-securitize this pandemic, and only 
began viewing this issue as a threat after the 
first cases were confirmed in March 2020. 
Because the government was late in declaring 
COVID-19 as an existential threat to national 
security, the audience does not fully accept the 
government’s securitization efforts because 
public trust in the government’s measures 
was already low. In addition, the means of 
emergency action taken by the government 
against the threat of COVID-19 are also limited, 
disproportionate to the threat of the disease.
Meanwhile, the Indonesian government’s 
securitization of COVID-19 has been characterized 
by the over-reliance on influential military figures 
and national security agencies, the tendency to 
downgrade the threats, lack of transparency, and 
even crackdown on anti-government smears. 
This finding shows that future studies should 
analyze how the number of military figures in 
the government influence the success or failure 
of securitization. In short, the government is 
bringing the COVID-19 measures under control 
of national security agencies, whose state 
security perspective prevails over health and 
epidemiological perspective. These security 
actors then are subordinating the human security 
dimension to the national security approach in 
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the COVID-19 measures, which in turn restricting 
its very efficacy.
The Indonesian government needs 
to change their approach to COVID-19 
measures and prioritize the human security 
dimension by not downgrading the threats 
and upholding transparency. The government 
also needs to restrict statements which 
complicate the communication of COVID-19 
issues. The government also needs to restore 
public confidence by improving its COVID-19 
measures. Finally, it helps to put the COVID-19 
measures under control of public health 
agencies with expertise on health care and 
epidemiology – and not putting them under 
leadership of military figures in the first place.
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